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Abstract
We review the quantum version of a well known problem of cryp-
tography called coin tossing (“flipping a coin via telephone”). It can be
regarded as a game where two remote players (who distrust each other)
tries to generate a uniformly distributed random bit which is common to
both parties. The only resource they can use to perform this task is a
classical or quantum communication channel. In this paper we provide a
general overview over such coin tossing protocols, concerning in particular
their security.
1 Introduction
Coin flipping was introduced in 1981 by Blum [2] as a solution to the following
cryptograhic problem (cited from [2]): “Alice and Bob want to flip a coin by
telephone. (They have just divorced, live in different cities, want to decide who
gets the car.) Bob would not like to tell Alice heads and hear Alice (at the other
end of the line) say: Here it goes... I’m flipping the coin... You lost!”. Hence
the basic difficulties are: both players (Alice and Bob) distrust each other, there
is no trustworthy third person available and the only resource they can use is
the communication channel. Although this problem sounds somewhat artificial,
coin tossing is a relevant building block which appears in many cryptograhic
protocols.
Within classical cryptography coin tossing protocols are in general based on
assumptions about the complexity of certain computational tasks like factoring
of large integers, which are unproven and, even worse, break down if quantum
computers become available. A subset of classical cryptography which suffer
from similar problems are public key cryptosystems. In this case however a
solution is available in form of quantum key distribution (cf. [4] for a review)
whose security is based only on the laws of quantum mechanics and no other
assumptions. Hence the natural question is: Does quantum mechanics provide
the same service for coin-tossing, i.e. is there a perfectly secure quantum coin-
tossing protocol? Although the answer is, as we will see, “no” [8, 10], quantum
coin-tossing provides a reasonable security improvement over classical schemes.
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The purpose of this paper is to give an overview over this field, emphasizing
in particular the game theoretic aspects, and to review some recent results.
Therefore its outline is as follows: In Section 2 we give a short survey on classical
and quantum systems and operations on them. This enables us in Section 3
to develop a general scheme which allows the description (and comparison) of
quantum as well as classical coin tossing protocols (which are considered in
Section 4), and which points out the game theoretic aspects of the subject.
In Section 5 we show how many questions, in particular optimality, can be
reduced to a simplified scheme where only unitary operators and von Neumann
measurements are involved. A recent example is given in Section 6 and some
conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Systems, states and operations
In general a quantum protocol requires manipulation and exchange of quantum
as well as classical data. It is therefore useful, to have a unified description for
all possible types of systems and operations which we will encounter (this is
only a brief survey; for a more detailed and complete presentation see [7], Ch.
2 and 3.).
• Quantum Systems: According to the rules of quantum mechanics, every
kind of quantum systems is associated with a Hilbert space H, which for
the purpose of this article we can take as finite dimensional. The simplest
quantum system has a two dimensional Hilbert space H = C2 , and is
called a qubit, for ‘quantum bit’. The observables of the system are given
by (bounded) operators. This space will be denoted by B(H). The prepa-
rations (states) are given by density operators, i.e. positive (trace-class)
operators ρ ∈ B(H) with trace one.
• Classical probability: The classical analog of a state of a (finite dimen-
sional) quantum system is a probability distribution px, x ∈ X on a finite
set X of “elementary events”, i.e. X describes the possible outcomes of a
(classical) statistical experiment, like tossing a coin (X = {head, number}
or throwing a dice (X = {1, . . . , 6}), and px is the probability that the
outcome x occurs. Without loss of generality we will assume in the follow-
ing that X = {1, . . . , n}, n ∈ N holds. The classical information contained
in p can be transformed easily into quantum information: We just have to
prepare for each elementary event x ∈ X an n-level quantum system (de-
scribed by a Hilbert space K) in a pure state |x〉〈x| ∈ B(K), where |x〉 ∈ K,
x ∈ X denotes a distinguished orthonormal basis and |x〉〈x| is the projec-
tor onto |x〉. If the event x ∈ X occurs with probability px, we get in this
way quantum systems in the (mixed) state ρp =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|. Each state
ρ which is diagonal in the basis |x〉, i.e. ρ =
∑
x ρx|x〉〈x|, can be realized
in this way, provided the initial probability distribution is ρx, x ∈ X . Now
we introduce the space C(X) ⊂ B(K) of diagoal (with respect to the basis
|x〉) operators on K. According to our previous discussion we can identify
the classical state space with the set of density operators in C(X).
• Hybrid systems: This point of view is very handy, if we want to describe
a “hybrid system” which contains a classical part, described by the set
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X and a quantum part, described by the Hilbert space H: A state of
a composite quantum system, consisting of two subsystems with Hilbert
spaces H and K, is given by a density operator ρ on the tensor product
H⊗K, i.e. ρ ∈ B(H)⊗B(K). If one of the subsystem is classical, we only
have to replace B(K) by C(X). Hence: states of a hybrid system can be
described by density operators ρ ∈ B(H)⊗C(X). It is easy to see that the
elements of B(H) ⊗ C(X) are operators which are block-diagonal of the
form ρ = diag(ρ1, . . . , ρn) with ρx ∈ B(H).
Summarizing our discussion up to now we can say that all three kinds of
systems can be described in terms of a Hilbert space H′ and a linear subspace
A ⊂ B(H′) which we will call in the following the observable algebra1 of the
system. The simple rule we have to follow is: states are described by density
operators in A.
This point of view is very useful if we consider channels which transform
one kind of information into another, e.g. quantum to classical or hybrid. They
are most naturally described in terms of completely positive, trace preserving
maps T : A → B, where A and B denote the observable algebras of the input
respectively output systems, and T (ρ) is the state at the output side of the
channel if the input system was in the state ρ. Alternatively we can consider
the dual T ∗ : B → A of T , which is characterized by the condition tr(T ∗(A)ρ) =
tr(AT (ρ)). It describes the operation in the Heisenberg picture, while T is the
Schro¨dinger picture representation. The following list summarizes some special
cases (arising from different choices for A and B) which will be relevant for the
rest of the paper.
• Quantum operations: If A = B = B(H) the map T describes a quan-
tum operation. The most simple case is just unitary time-evolution, i.e.
T (ρ) = UρU∗ with unitary operator U . In general however, we have to
take interactions with additional, unobservable degrees of freedom into
account (“environment”) and T becomes
T (ρ) = trK
(
U(ρ⊗ ρ0)U
∗), (1)
where K and ρ0 denote Hilbert space and initial state of the environment
(which can be chosen to be pure) and U describes now the common evolu-
tion of both systems. It is a simple consequence of Stinespring’s theorem
[14] that each quantum operation can be written this way.
• Observables: If A is quantum (A = B(H)) and B is classical (B = C(X))
we can define T (x) = T ∗(|x〉〈x|). It is easy to see that the family T (x) ∈
B(H), x ∈ X of operators forms a POV measure, hence T describes a
(generalized) observable and tr(ρT (x)) is the probability to measure the
value x on systems in the state ρ ∈ B(H). We will identify in the following
the observable T with the family T (x) and write: “let T = (T (1), . . . , T (n))
be an observable”. Note that this interpretation makes sense as well, if
we insert for A a classical or hybrid algebra. Hence we can look at the
corresponding observables as special cases of quantum observables.
1This name originates from the fact that 1. A is in all three cases not only a linear space
but a *-algebra (i.e., closed under multiplication and adjoints) and 2. that self-adjoint (i.e.
“real valued”) elements of A represent the (projection valued) observables of the system in
question.
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• Instruments: If we are interested in the state of the quantum system after
the measurement (in addition to the measuring result), we have to consider
“Instruments” i.e. channels with quantum input (A = B(H)) and hybrid
output (B = B(H)⊗C(X)). To each instrument T and each x ∈ X we can
associate a (non trace preserving!) quantum operation Tx : B(H)→ B(H)
by T ∗x (A) = T
∗(A ⊗ |x〉〈x|). For each input state ρ the density operator
tr(Txρ)
−1T (ρ) describes the state of the system after the measurement if
the value x ∈ X was obtained, while the probability to measure x ∈ X is
given by tr(Txρ). Hence the observable (i.e. the POV measure) associated
to T is T (x) = T ∗(1I⊗ |x〉〈x|), x ∈ X .
• Parameter dependent instruments: Finally, let us consider a channel with
hybrid input and output, i.e. A = B = B(H) ⊗ C(X). For each x ∈ X
we get an instrument Tx by Tx(ρ) = T (ρ⊗ |x〉〈x|). Hence T describes an
instrument whose behavior depends on the additional classical input data
x ∈ X .
3 Coin tossing protocols
Two players (as usual called Alice and Bob) are separated from each other and
want to create a random bit, which can take both possible values with equal
probability. However they do not trust each other and there is no trustworthy
third person who can flip the coin for them. Hence they only can exchange data
until they have agreed on a value 0 or 1 or until one player is convinced that the
other is cheating; in this case we will write ∅ for the corresponding outcome.
To describe such a coin tossing protocol mathematically, we need three ob-
servable algebras A, B and M, where A and B represent private information,
which is only accessible by Alice and Bob respectively – Alice’s and Bob’s
“notepad” – while M is a public area, which is used by both players to ex-
change data. We will call it in the following the “mailbox”. Each of the three
algebras A, B and M contain in general a classical and a quantum part, i.e.
we have A = C(XA) ⊗ B(HA) and similar for B and M. A typical choice is
HA = H⊗n and XA = Bm where H = C2 and B denotes the field with two
elements – in other words Alice’s notepad consists in this case of n qubits and
m classical bits.
If Alice wants to send data (classical or quantum) to Bob, she has to store
them in the mailbox system, where Bob can read them off in the next round.
Hence each processing step of the protocol (except the first and the last one)
can be described as follows: Alice (or Bob) uses her own private data and the
information provided by Bob (via the mailbox) to perform some calculations.
Afterwards she writes the results in part to her notepad and in part to the
mailbox. An operation of this kind can be described by a completely positive
map TA : A⊗M→ A⊗M, or (if executed by Bob) by TB :M⊗B →M⊗B.
Based on these structures we can describe a coin tossing protocol as follows:
At the beginning Alice and Bob prepare their private systems in some initial
state. Alice uses in addition the mailbox system to share some information about
her preparation with Bob, i.e. Alice prepares the system A⊗M in a (possibly
entangled, or at least correlated) state ρ
(0)
A , while Bob prepares his notepad in
the state ρ
(0)
B . Hence the state of the composite system becomes ρ
(0) = ρ
(0)
A ⊗ρ
(0)
B .
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Figure 1: Schematic picture of a quantum coin-tossing protocol. The curly arrows
stands for the flow of quantum or classical information or both.
Now Alice and Bob start to operate alternately2 on the system, as described in
the last paragraph, i.e. Alice in terms of operations TA : A⊗M→ A⊗M and
Bob with TB : M⊗B → M⊗B. After N rounds
3 the systems ends therefore
in the state (cf. Figure 1)
ρ(N) = (T
(N)
A ⊗ IdB)(IdA⊗T
(N−1)
B ) · · · (T
(2)
A ⊗ IdB)(IdA⊗T
(1)
B )ρ
(0), (2)
where IdA, IdB are the identity maps on A and B. Note that we have assumed
here without loss of generality that Alice performs the first (i.e. providing the
initial preparation of the mailbox) and the last step (applying the operation TA).
It is obvious how we have to change the following discussion if Bob starts the
game or if N is odd. To determine the result Alice and Bob perform measure-
ments on their notepads. The corresponding observables EA = (E
(0)
A , E
(1)
A , E
(∅)
A )
and EB = (E
(0)
B , E
(1)
B , E
(∅)
B ) can have the three possible outcomes X = {0, 1, ∅},
which we have described already above. The tuples
σA = (ρ
(0)
A ;T
(2)
A , . . . , T
(N+2)
A ;EA), σB = (ρ
(0)
B ;T
(1)
B , . . . , T
(N+1)
B ;EB) (3)
consists of all parts of the protocol Alice respectively Bob can influence. Hence
we will call σA Alice’s and σB Bob’s strategy. The sets of all strategies of Alice
respectively Bob are denoted by ΣA and ΣB. Note that ΣA depends only on the
algebras A and M while ΣB depends on B and M. Occasionally it is useful to
emphasize this dependency (the number of rounds is kept fixed in this paper).
In this case we write ΣA(A,M) and ΣB(B,M) instead of ΣA and ΣB. The
probability that Alice gets the result a ∈ X if she applies the strategy σA ∈ ΣA
and Bob gets b ∈ X with strategy σB ∈ ΣB is
P(σA, σB; a, b) = tr
[
(E
(a)
A ⊗ 1I⊗ E
(b)
B )ρ
(N)
]
. (4)
2This means we are considering only turn based protocols. If special relativity, and therefore
finite propagation speed for information, is taken into account it can be reasonable to consider
simultaneous exchange of information; cf. e.g. [6] for details.
3Basically N is the maximal number of rounds: After K < N steps Alice (Bob) can apply
identity maps, i.e. T
(j)
A
= Id for j > K.
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If both measurements in the last step yield the same result a = b = 0 or
1 the procedure is successful (and the outcome is a). If the results differ or
if one player signals ∅ the protocol fails. As stated above we are interested in
protocols which do not fail and which produce 0 and 1 with equal probability.
Another crucial requirement concerns security: Neither Alice nor Bob should
be able to improve the probabilities of the outcomes 0 or 1 by “cheating”, i.e.
selecting strategies which deviate from the predefined protocol. At this point it
is crucial to emphasize that we do not make any restricting assumptions about
the resources Alice and Bob can use to cheat – they are potentially unlimited.
This includes in particular the possibility of arbitrarily large notepads. In the
next definition this is expressed by the (arbitrary) algebra R.
Definition 3.1 A pair of strategies (σA, σB) ∈ ΣA(A,M)×ΣB(B,M) is called
a (strong) coin tossing protocol with bias ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2] if the following conditions
holds for any (finite dimensional) observable algebra R
1. Correctness: P(σA, σB; 0, 0) = P(σA, σB; 1, 1) =
1
2 ,
2. Security against Alice: ∀σ′A ∈ ΣA(R,M) and ∀x ∈ {0, 1} we have
P(σ′A, σB ;x, x) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ (5)
3. Security against Bob: ∀σ′B ∈ ΣB(R,M) and ∀x ∈ {0, 1} we have
P(σA, σ
′
B ;x, x) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ (6)
The two security conditions in this definition imply that neither Alice nor
Bob can increase the probability of the outcome 0 or 1 beyond the bound 1/2+ǫ.
However it is more natural to think of coin tossing as a game with payoff defined
according to the following table
Alice Bob
a=b=0 1 0
a=b=1 0 1
other 0 0
(7)
This implies that Alice tries to increase only the probability for the outcome 0
and not for 1 while Bob tries to do the contrary, i.e. increase the probability for
1. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.2 A pair of strategies (σA, σB) ∈ ΣA(A,M)×ΣB(B,M) is called
a weak coin tossing protocol, if item 1 of Definition 3.1 holds, and if items 2
and 3 are replaced by
2’ Weak security against Alice: ∀σ′A ∈ ΣA(R,M) we have
P(σ′A, σB; 0, 0) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ, (8)
3’ Weak security against Bob: ∀σ′B ∈ ΣB(R,M) we have
P(σA, σ
′
B; 1, 1) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ. (9)
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Here R stands again for any finite dimensional (but arbitrarily large) observable
algebra.
Good coin tossing protocols are of course those with a small bias. Hence the
central question is: What is the smallest bias which we have to take into account,
and how do the corresponding optimal strategies look like? To get an answer,
however, is quite difficult. Up to now there are only partial results available (cf.
Section 7 for a summary).
Other but related questions arises if we exploit the game theoretic nature of
the problem. In this context it is reasonable to look at a whole class of quantum
games, which arises from the scheme developed up to now. We only have to fix
the algebras4 A, B and M and to specify a payoff matrix as in Equation (7).
The latter, however, has to be done carefully. If we consider instead of (7) the
payoff
Alice Bob
a=b=0 1 -1
a=b=1 -1 1
other 0 0
(10)
we get a zero sum game, which seems at a first look very reasonable. Unfor-
tunately it admits a very simple (and boring) optimal strategy: Bob produces
always the outcome 1 on his side while Alice claims always that she has measured
0. Hence they never agree and nobody has to pay. The game from Equation (7)
does not suffer from this problem, because a draw is for Alice as bad as the case
a = b = 1 where Bob wins.
4 Classical coin tossing
Let us now add some short remarks on classical coin tossing, which is included
in the general scheme just developed as a special case: We only have to choose
classical algebras for A, B and M, i.e. A = C(XA), B = C(XB) and M =
C(XM ). The completely positive maps TA and TB describing the operations
performed by Alice and Bob are in this case given by matrices of transition
probabilities (see Sect. 3.2.3 of [7] to see how to relate these matrices to the
operations T ). This implies in particular that the strategies in ΣA, ΣB are in
general mixed strategies. This is natural – there is of course no classical coin
tossing protocol consisting of pure strategies, because it would lead always to
the same result (either always 0 or always 1). However, we can decompose
each mixed strategy in a unique way into a convex linear combination of pure
strategies, and this can be used to show that there is no classical coin tossing
protocol, which admits the kind of security contained in Definition 3.1 and 3.2.
Proposition 4.1 There is no (weak) classical coin tossing protocol with bias
ǫ < 12 .
4In contrast to the security definitions given above this means that we assume limited
recourses (notepads) of Alice and Bob. This simplifies the analysis of the problem and should
not be a big restriction (from the practical point of view) if the notepads are fixed but very
large.
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Proof. Assume a classical coin tossing protocol (σA, σB) is given. Since its
outcome is by definition probabilistic, σA or σB (or both) are mixed strategies
which can be decomposed (in a unique way) into pure strategies. Let us denote
the sets of pure strategies appearing in this decomposition by Σ′A, Σ
′
B. Since
the protocol (σA, σB) is correct, each pair (sA, sB) ∈ Σ′A × Σ
′
B leads to a valid
outcome, i.e. either 0 or 1 on both sides. Hence there are two possibilities to
construct a zero-sum game, either Alice wins if the outcome is 0 and Bob if it
is 1 or the other way round. In both cases we get a zero-sum two-person game
with perfect information, no chance moves5 and only two outcomes. In those
games one player has a winning strategy (cf. Sect. 15.6, 15.7 of [15]), i.e. if she
(or he) follows that strategy she wins with certainty, no matter which strategy
the opponent uses. This includes in particular the case where the other player
is honest and follows the protocol. If we apply this arguments to both variants
of the game, we see that either one player could force both possible outcomes or
one bit could be forced by both players. Both cases only fit into the definition
of (weak) coin tossing if the bias is 1/2. This proves the proposition. ✷
Note that the proof is not applicable in the quantum case (in fact there are
coin tossing protocols with bias less than 1/2 as we will see in Section 6). One
reason is that in the quantum case one does not have perfect information. E.g.
if Alice sends a qubit to Bob, he does not know what qubit he got. He could
perform a measurement, but if he measures in a wrong basis, he will inevitably
change the qubit.
Another way to circumvent the negative result of the previous proposition
is to weaken the assumption that both players can perform any operation on
their data. A possible practical restriction which come into mind immediately is
limited computational power, i.e. we can assume that no player is able to solve
intractable problems like factorization of large integers in an acceptable time.
Within the definition given above this means that Alice and Bob do not have
access to all strategies in ΣA and ΣB but only to certain subsets. Of course,
such additional restrictions can be imposed as well in the quantum case. To
distinguish the much stronger security requirements in Definition 3.1 and 3.2 a
protocol is sometimes called unconditionally secure, if no additional assumptions
about the accessible cheating strategies are necessary (loosely speaking: the
“laws of quantum mechanics” are the only restriction).
5 The unitary normal form
A special class of quantum coin tossing arises if: 1. all algebras are quantum, i.e.
A = B(HA), B = B(HB) and M = B(HM ) with Hilbert spaces HA, HB and
HM ; 2. the initial preparation is pure: ρa = |ψA〉〈ψA| and |ψB〉〈ψB | with ψA ∈
HA⊗HM and ψB ∈ HB; 3. the operations T
(j)
A , T
(k)
B are unitarily implemented:
T
(j)
A (ρ) = U
(j)
A ρU
(j)∗
A with a unitary operator U
(j)
A on HA⊗HM and something
similar holds for Bob and 4. the observables EA, EB are projection valued. It is
easy to see that the corresponding strategies (σA, σB) ∈ ΣA×ΣB do not admit
a proper convex decomposition into other strategies. Hence we will call them
in the following pure strategies. In contrast to the classical case it is possible
5That means there are no outside probability experiments like dice throws.
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to construct correct coin tossing protocols with pure strategies. The following
proposition was stated for the first time (in a less explicit way) in [9] and shows
that we can replace a mixed strategy always by a pure one without loosing
security.
Proposition 5.1 For each strategy σA ∈ ΣA(A,M) with A ⊂ B(HA) there is a
Hilbert space KA and a unitary strategy σ˜A ∈ ΣA(A˜,M) with A = B(HA⊗KA)
such that
P(σA, σB ;x, y) = P(σ
′
A, σB ;x, y) (11)
holds for all σB ∈ ΣB(B,M) (with arbitrary Bob algebra B) and all x, y ∈
{0, 1, ∅}. A similar statement holds for Bob’s strategies.
Proof. We will only give a sketch of the proof here; the details are given in
[3]. Note first that all observable algebras A, B and M are linear subspaces
of pure quantum algebras, i.e. A ⊂ B(HA), B ⊂ B(HB) and M ⊂ B(HM ). In
addition it can be shown that Alice’s operations TA : A⊗M→ B(HA)⊗B(HM)
can be extended to a channel T˜A : B(HA) ⊗ B(HM ) → B(HA) ⊗ B(HM ), i.e.
a quantum operation [11]; something similar holds for Bob’s operations. Hence
we can restrict the proof to the case where all three observable algebras are
quantum. Now the statement basically follows from the fact that we can find
for each item in the sequence TA = (ρA;T
(2)
A , . . . , T
(N)
A ;EA) a “dilation”. For
the operations T
(j)
A this is just the ancilla representation given in Equation (1),
i.e.
T
(j)
A (ρ) = tr2
(
V (j)(ρ⊗ |φ(j)〉〈φ(j)|)V (j)∗
)
(12)
with a Hilbert space L(j), a unitary V (j) onHA⊗L(j) and a pure state φ(j) ∈ L(j)
(and tr2 denotes the partial trace over L(j)). Similarly, there is a Hilbert space
L(0) and a pure state φ(0) ∈ HA ⊗ L(0) such that
ρA = tr2(|φ
(0)〉〈φ(0)|) (13)
holds (i.e. φ(0) is the purification of ρA; cf. [7] Sect. 2.2), and finally we have
a Hilbert space L(N+2), a pure state φ(N+2) and a projection valued measure
F (0), F (1), F (∅) ∈ B(HA ⊗ L(N+2)) with
tr(E
(x)
A ρ) = tr
(
F (x)(ρ⊗ |φ(N+2)〉〈φ(N+2)|)
)
, (14)
this is another concequence of Stinesprings theorem. Now we can define the
unitary strategy σ˜A as follows:
KA = L
(0) ⊗ L(2) ⊗ . . .⊗ L(N) ⊗ L(N+2) (15)
ψA = φ
(0) ⊗ φ(2) ⊗ · · · ⊗ φ(N) ⊗ φ(N+2) (16)
U
(j)
A = 1I0 ⊗ 1I2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ V
(j) ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1IN ⊗ 1IN+2 (17)
E˜
(x)
A = 1I0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1IN ⊗ F
(x), (18)
where 1Ik denotes the unit operator on L(k) and in Equation (17) we have im-
plicitly used the canonical isomorphism between HA⊗KA and L(0)⊗· · ·⊗HA⊗
9
L(j) ⊗ . . . ⊗ L(N+2) . What remains to show, but is omitted here, is to check
that this σ˜A satisfies Equation (11). ✷
This result allows us to restrict many discussions to pure strategies. This is
very useful for the proof of no-go theorems or for calculations of general bounds
on the bias of coin-tossing protocols. This concerns in particular the results in [1]
which apply, due to Proposition 5.1 immediately to the general case introduced
in Section 3. Many concrete examples (cf. the next section) are however mixed
protocols and to rewrite them in a pure form is not necessarily helpful.
6 A particular example
In this section we are giving a concrete example for a strong coin tossing pro-
tocol. It has a bias of ǫ = 0.25 and is derived from a quantum bit commitment
protocol. (a procedure related to coin tossing) given in [12]. Bit commitment is
another two person protocol which is related to coin tossing. It is always possible
to construct a coin tossing protocol from a bit commitment protocol but not
the other way round (cf. [6]). Hence statements about the security of certain
bit commitment protocols can be translated into statements about the bias of
the related coin tossing protocols. This shows together with [12] that the given
protocol has the claimed bias.
6.1 The protocol
In this protocol we take HA = HM = C3,HB = C3 ⊗ C3 plus classical parts of
at most 2 bits for each notepad. The canonical base in the Hilbert space C3 is
denoted by |i〉, i = 0, 1, 2
1. preparation step: Alice throws a coin, the result is bA ∈ {0, 1}, with prob-
ability 1/2 each. She stores the result and prepares the system B(HA) ⊗
B(HM ) in the state |ψbA〉〈ψbA |, where |ψ0〉 =
1√
2
(|0, 0〉+ |1, 2〉) and |ψ1〉 =
1√
2
(|1, 1〉+ |0, 2〉) are orthogonal to each other. Bob throws a similar coin,
and stores the result bB. The initial preparation of his quantum part is
arbitrary.
2. Bob reads the mailbox (i.e. swaps it with the second part of his Hilbert
space) and sends bB to Alice.
3. Alice receives bB and puts her remaining quantum system into the mail-
box.
4. Bob reads the mailbox and puts the system into the first slot of this
quantum register.
5. results: The result on Alice’s side is bA⊕bB, where⊕ is the addition modulo
2. Bob performs a projective measurement on his quantum system with
P (0) = |ψ0〉〈ψ0|, P
(1) = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and P
(∅) = 1I− P (0) − P (1), with result
b′A. If everybody followed the protocol b
′
A = bA. So the result on Bob’s
side is b′A ⊕ bB.
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6.2 Possible cheating strategies
Now we will give possible cheating strategies for each party which lead to the
maximal probability of achieving the preferred outcome. For simplicity we just
look at the case where Alice prefers the outcome to be 0, whereas Bob prefers it
to be 1, cheating strategies for the other cases are easily derivable. A cheating
strategy for Bob is to try to distinguish in step 2 whether Alice has prepared |ψ0〉
or |ψ1〉. For this purpose he performs the measurement (|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|, |2〉〈2|). If
the result cB 6= 2 (the probability for this in either case is 1/2) he can identify
bA = cB and set bB = cB ⊕ 1 to achieve the overall result 1. If cB = 2 holds,
he has not learned anything about bA. In that case he just continues with the
protocol and hopes for the desired result, which appears with the probability
1/2.6 So the total probability for Bob to achieve the result 0 is 12 +
1
2 ·
1
2 =
3
4 .
A cheating strategy for Alice is to set in the initial step bA = 0 and to prepare
the system B(HA) ⊗ B(HM ) in the state |ψ˜0〉 =
1√
6
(|0, 0〉+ |0, 1〉+ 2 · |1, 2〉).
Then she continues until step 3. If bB = 0 she just continues with the proto-
col. Then the probability that in the last step Bob measures b′B = 0 equals
tr(|ψ˜0〉〈ψ˜0| · |ψ0〉〈ψ0|) = |〈ψ0|ψ˜0〉|2 =
3
4 . If bB = 1 she first applies a unitary
operator, which swaps |0〉 and |1〉, on her system before she sends it to Bob. The
state on Bob’s side is than |ψ˜1〉〈ψ˜1| with |ψ˜1〉 =
1√
6
(|1, 0〉+ |1, 1〉+ 2 · |0, 2〉).
The probability that Bob measures b′B = 1 equals tr(|ψ˜1〉〈ψ˜1| · |ψ1〉〈ψ1|) =
|〈ψ1|ψ˜1〉|2 =
3
4 . So the total probability for Alice to get the outcome 0 is
1
2 ·
3
4 +
1
2 ·
3
4 =
3
4 .
7 Conclusions
The previous example shows that quantum coin tossig admits, in contrast to
the classical case, a nontrivial bias. However, how secure quantum coin tossing
really is? Can we reach the optimal case (ǫ = 0)? The answer actually is “no”,
or to state it more explicitly:
Theorem 7.1 There is no (strong or weak) coin tossing protocol with bias ǫ =
0.
This was first proven by Mayers, Salvail and Chiba-Kohno [10]. Later on
Ambainis recalls the arguments in a more explicit form [1]7. It is still an open
question, whether there exists quantum coin tossing protocols with bias arbi-
trarily near to zero. Ambainis also shows that a coin tossing protocol with a bias
of at most ǫ must use at least Ω(log log 1
ǫ
) rounds of communication. Although
in that paper he gives only the proof for strong coin tossing, it holds in the weak
6After that measurement he is no longer able to figure out which outcome occurs on Alice’s
side, so he just sets his outcome to 1. A similar situation occurs in the cheating strategy for
Alice, but she is in neither case able to predict the outcome on Bob’s side with certainty.
7The first attempt for a proof, given by Lo and Chau [8]. However, its validity is restricted
to the case where ‘cheating’ always influences the probabilities of both valid outcomes. More
precisely they demand that the probabilities for the outcomes 0 and 1 are equal, for any
cheating strategy. This restriction is too strong, even if Alice and Bob sit together and throw
a real coin one of them can always say he (she) does not accept the result (and for example
refuses to pay his loss) and so put the probability for one outcome to zero while the probability
for the other one and the outcome invalid are 1/2 each.
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case as well. It follows that a protocol cannot be made arbitrarily secure (i.e.
have a sequence of protocols with ǫ → 0) with just increasing the amount of
information exchanged in each step. The number of rounds has to go to infinity
(although very slow).
The strong coin tossing protocol given in section 6 has a bias of ǫ = 0.25.
Another one with the same bias is given by Ambainis [1]. No strong protocol
with provable smaller bias is known yet. The best known weak protocol is given
by Spekkens and Rudolph [13] and has a bias of ǫ = 1√
2
− 12 = 0.207 . . . .
Although this is still far from arbitrarily secure, it shows another distinction
between classical and quantum information, as in a classical world no protocol
with bias smaller than 0.5 is possible.
Another interesting topic in quantum coin tossing is the question of cheat-
sensitivity, that means how much can each player increase the probability of one
outcome without risking being caught cheating. For more about this cf e.g. [13]
or [5].
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